Surrogacy in Indiana: The Complete 2026 Guide

⛔ Indiana voids surrogate agreements by statute. It does not criminalize them, and it does not ban surrogacy. Those are three different things, and most write-ups here collapse them.

IC 31-20-1-2, in full: "A surrogate agreement described in section 1 of this chapter that is formed after March 14, 1988, is void."

⚠️ Section 1 is where the content is. IC 31-20-1-1 declares it against public policy "to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate" to provide a gamete, become pregnant, consent to or undergo an abortion, undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination, use a substance or engage in activity only as another person demands, waive parental rights, terminate care, custody or control of a child, or consent to a stepparent adoption.

So section 2 voids only an agreement "described in section 1." In practice nearly every real agreement requires several of those things, so the reach is broad.

And the parentage route is real, but it is judge-made and it is narrow. Indiana's Court of Appeals held that a carrier cannot disestablish her own maternity, while an intended mother can establish hers by clear and convincing evidence.

Ivy does not arrange journeys in Indiana. This page gives the text and the practical consequences.

Indiana's surrogacy law is one chapter, three sections, unchanged since the 1997 recodification of a 1988 enactment. Title 31, Article 20 "Family Law: Human Reproduction," contains exactly one chapter — Chapter 1, Surrogate Agreements. That is the whole of it.

IC 31-20-1, in full

§ 31-20-1-1 — against public policy to enforce any term requiring a surrogate to: "(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child. (2) Become pregnant. (3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion. (4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination. (5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance with the demands of another person. (6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child. (7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child. (8) Consent to a stepparent adoption…"

§ 31-20-1-2 — such an agreement, formed after 14 March 1988, "is void."

Read the two together and the scope becomes precise. Section 2 voids only an agreement "described in section 1" — one that requires the surrogate to do at least one of those eight things. ⚠️ In practice nearly every real agreement requires several of them, so the practical reach is broad even though the drafting is conditional.

§ 31-20-1-3 is protective, and it is the provision most write-ups skip. A court "may not base a decision concerning the best interests of a child in any civil action solely on evidence" that the parties entered into or acted under a surrogate agreement, "unless a party proves that the surrogate agreement was entered into through duress, fraud, or misrepresentation."

The definitions, and the gap in them

§ 31-9-2-126 defines "surrogate" through three genetic configurations, every one of which requires an intended biological parent. § 31-9-2-127 defines "surrogate agreement" as one "entered into before the birth of a child" and intended "to induce the surrogate to relinquish care, custody, and control over the child at birth."

⚠️ On the face of that text, an arrangement with no intended biological parent — a donated embryo — sits outside both definitions, and therefore outside § 31-20-1-2. We located no Indiana decision saying so. That is a reading, not a rule, and an untested reading is not a plan.

Parentage — no maternity article, and a route the courts built anyway

Title 31 has no maternity article. Article 14 is "Establishment of Paternity," 22 chapters of it; Article 13 covers children of void marriages, children born out of wedlock, and termination. Nothing in the code sets out an action to determine a mother-child relationship.

The Court of Appeals supplied one. From the Indiana Office of Court Services' summary of In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T. (2013), verbatim: "A petition to disestablish maternity is not cognizable, but maternity can be indirectly disestablished by a putative mother petitioning the court for the establishment of maternity and proving her maternity by clear and convincing evidence." Transfer was denied, 999 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 2013), Rush, J., dissenting. The earlier decision is In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Pre-birth filing is statutory for paternity. § 31-14-4-1 names as filers "a man alleging that … he is the expectant father of an unborn child" and "the expectant mother and a man alleging that he is the biological father of her unborn child, filing jointly." And § 31-14-8-1 supplies the order: "The court may enter a finding that a man is the child's biological father without first holding a hearing" on a verified written stipulation or a joint petition. In Infant T. the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that "Indiana law does not allow for the pre-birth establishment of paternity in these circumstances." ⚠️ That reaches a genetic intended father only — there is no pre-birth maternity order and no complete two-parent order.

At the registrar

§ 16-37-2-10 permits a DNA-based addition to a birth certificate only if "a father is not named" — a father-only mechanism with no maternity analogue. The Department of Health's corrections and amendments page routes surrogate questions to a help desk ticket; there is no published form and no published fee.

What is not in the chapter

No criminal penalty. No compensation ban. No prohibition on being a surrogate. Indiana is a void-contract state, not a criminal one, and the difference matters.

General information, not legal advice.

⛔ Ivy does not arrange journeys in Indiana — that is about where a journey is placed, not about where you live. An intended parent living in Indiana can pursue a journey in a state where we do work. ⚠️ The constraint here is local, and the reason is that IC 31-20-1-2 makes the agreement itself void — the document your protections would normally sit in.

But the parentage route is real, and it is worth knowing precisely. Indiana's Court of Appeals decided it in In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant T. (2013). The Indiana Office of Court Services' own summary, verbatim: "A petition to disestablish maternity is not cognizable, but maternity can be indirectly disestablished by a putative mother petitioning the court for the establishment of maternity and proving her maternity by clear and convincing evidence."

Three consequences follow, and they are not the same for everyone:

• A genetic intended father can bring a paternity action, and IC 31-14-4-1 lets him file before birth: it names "a man alleging that … he is the expectant father of an unborn child." § 31-14-8-1 lets the court find him the biological father without a hearing on a verified stipulation or joint petition, and Infant T. reversed a trial court that had refused a pre-birth paternity finding.
• A genetic intended mother must establish her maternity — by clear and convincing evidence, not by affidavit or stipulation.
• A non-genetic intended mother has no maternity to prove. In Infant T. the intended father's wife planned to proceed by adoption.

And note the counterweight. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer, but Justice Rush dissented: "The relief the petitioner seeks would result in the court enforcing what amounts to a surrogacy agreement."

Contact us and we will tell you plainly what we can and cannot do.

⛔ There is no Ivy price for Indiana, because Ivy does not place journeys here.

And the usual cost structure does not carry over, because the contract that normally holds it is void. IC 31-20-1-2 voids a surrogate agreement described in § 31-20-1-1. ⛔ A budget line resting on an unenforceable promise is not a budget line.

We located no Indiana statute capping or regulating surrogate compensation, no escrow requirement and no agency licensing rule — and that absence is not permission. The operative provision is the one that voids the agreement.

Legal work is the cost that is real in Indiana, and it is unusually front-loaded. The parentage plan has to be matched to the actual genetics before anything medical happens: a genetic father's paternity action, a genetic mother's petition to establish maternity by clear and convincing evidence, or — where the intended mother is not genetically related — adoption.

Budget for the registrar too. Indiana publishes no surrogate-birth form and no published fee; its amendments page directs surrogate questions to a help desk ticket.

For what a journey costs where Ivy does work, see the intended parents overview or contact us.

⛔ There is no Ivy process to describe in Indiana, because Ivy does not match here. What a reader needs is the order in which an Indiana attorney would work the problem.

1. Is the agreement "described in section 1"? IC 31-20-1-2 voids only an agreement that requires the surrogate to do one of the eight listed things. Almost every real agreement does.
2. Is there an intended biological parent? IC 31-9-2-126 and § 31-9-2-127 both require one. ⛔ An arrangement with none sits outside the definitions on their face — an untested reading, not a plan.
3. Map the parentage route to the actual genetics. A genetic father files a paternity action; IC 31-14-4-1 permits filing before birth and § 31-14-8-1 permits a finding without a hearing on a joint petition. A genetic mother petitions to establish maternity and must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.
4. If the intended mother is not genetically related, ask about adoption early, because the maternity route is unavailable to her.
5. Plan the birth certificate separately. IC 16-37-2-10 allows a DNA-based addition only if "a father is not named" — there is no maternity analogue at the registrar.
6. Expect the registrar to handle this case by case. Indiana's vital-records amendments page routes surrogate questions to a help desk ticket, not a form.

Contact us and we will be straight with you about where we work.

⛔ Ivy does not accept surrogate applications from Indiana residents. Here is what Indiana law actually says about your position.

Nothing makes you a criminal, and nothing makes carrying a pregnancy unlawful. IC 31-20-1 contains no penalty provision and no compensation ban.

The statute is written to protect you, not to punish you. § 31-20-1-1 makes it against public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that requires you to become pregnant, to undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination, to use a substance or act only as another person demands, or to waive parental rights — and § 31-20-1-2 makes such an agreement void.

Read that twice, because it cuts both ways. Terms written to bind you are unenforceable — and so are the terms written to protect you. ⛔ A void agreement protects nobody selectively.

§ 31-20-1-3 is the provision worth remembering. A court may not decide a child's best interests "solely on evidence" that you entered into or acted under a surrogate agreement, absent proof of duress, fraud, or misrepresentation. The legislature told Indiana courts not to hold the arrangement against you.

And you cannot petition to remove yourself as the child's mother. The Court of Appeals held that petition "not cognizable."

If you are being recruited for an Indiana arrangement, take the agreement to an Indiana attorney first.

⛔ Ivy does not accept applications from Indiana residents, so Ivy's criteria do not apply here.

And no Indiana statute sets any. We located no minimum age, no prior-birth requirement, no BMI limit, no screening protocol, no independent-counsel rule and no residency rule for a surrogate. IC 31-20-1 is three sections about agreements, not about people.

⛔ The absence of criteria is not an open field. The operative rule is that an agreement requiring you to become pregnant, undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination, or waive parental rights is void under § 31-20-1-2.

The one rule that will shape your paperwork is judge-made. Indiana's Court of Appeals held that a birth mother's petition to disestablish her own maternity is not cognizable — maternity can only be displaced indirectly, by another woman establishing hers by clear and convincing evidence. Practically: you cannot sign yourself off the record, and if the intended mother has no genetic link, there may be no one who can displace you except through adoption.

Ask about that before anything medical begins, and ask an Indiana attorney rather than a recruiter.

⛔ There is no Ivy compensation package for Indiana, because Ivy does not match here.

Compensation is not what Indiana's statute regulates. Unlike several states, IC 31-20-1 contains no payment cap, no compensation ban and no escrow rule. Money is not the trigger — the listed terms are.

What the statute does instead is remove the agreement's force. § 31-20-1-2 makes an agreement described in § 31-20-1-1 void, and § 1 reaches "any term" requiring a surrogate to become pregnant, undergo medical or psychological treatment, or waive parental rights.

So a payment schedule written into that agreement is a promise a court may decline to enforce. ⚠️ That is the practical risk to you, and it is not hypothetical — it applies to every promise made in your direction, not only the ones made in theirs.

One provision is squarely on your side. § 31-20-1-3 forbids a court from deciding a child's best interests "solely on evidence" that you entered into or acted under a surrogate agreement, absent duress, fraud, or misrepresentation.

Before you rely on any Indiana payment schedule, have an Indiana attorney tell you in writing whether the agreement carrying it is enforceable. For what compensation looks like where Ivy works, see the compensation page.

⚠️ Ivy does not match in Indiana, so nothing here is a recommendation for a surrogacy journey. A reader in the state may still be looking for fertility care.

We have not verified an Indiana fertility practice for this page. Rather than repeat a directory listing, this section says so. When we list a clinic we check its own website, including the state it is in — a check this page has not completed for Indiana.

Ask any practice directly which parts of an IVF or carrier cycle it performs, where its laboratory is, and whether it accepts carrier cycles at all.

And keep the two questions apart. A clinic's willingness to perform a transfer says nothing about whether the agreement behind it survives IC 31-20-1-2, or about which intended parent can be adjudicated a parent afterward. The clinical question and the legal question are different questions, and the statute only answers the second.

Statute — IC 31-20-1, Surrogate Agreements: § 31-20-1-1 (against public policy to enforce any term requiring a surrogate to become pregnant, undergo medical or psychological treatment or examination, waive parental rights, or terminate care, custody or control — eight listed terms in all) · § 31-20-1-2 (such an agreement formed after 14 March 1988 "is void") · § 31-20-1-3 (a court may not decide best interests "solely on evidence" of the agreement, absent duress, fraud or misrepresentation).

Definitions: § 31-9-2-126 "Surrogate" · § 31-9-2-127 "Surrogate agreement." ⚠️ Both require an intended biological parent.

Parentage: § 31-14-4-1 — a paternity action may be filed by "a man alleging that … he is the expectant father of an unborn child," or by "the expectant mother and a man … filing jointly." ⛔ Title 31 has no maternity article.

Case law: Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), transfer denied, 999 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 2013) (Rush, J., dissenting) · In re Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

Birth certificates: § 16-37-2-10 (DNA-based addition only if "a father is not named") · IDOH corrections and amendments — surrogate questions go to a help desk ticket.

Chinese intended parents: Indiana is in the Chicago consulate's district.

Ivy: Ivy does not arrange journeys in Indiana. Contact us. Nearby: Illinois · Ohio · Kentucky.